Rory Smead & Patrick Forber (2020)
Philosophy of Science 87(5), pp. 884–896

Abstract. We examine contemporary game-theoretic accounts of ownership as a convention. New results from dynamic networks complicate matters, suggesting that if ownership is conventional, it should not be as prevalent as it seems to be. In fact, such models reveal a tendency toward antiownership norms. The value of resources may be crucial: low stakes lead to conventional ownership, but ownership norms rarely evolve; high stakes lead to a predominance of ownership at the cost of its conventionality. We argue that conventional ownership norms can originate in nonconventional ways and discuss some philosophical implications.
OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
GdL (2 janvier 2021). Convention and the Origins of Ownership. Économie des conventions. Consulté le 8 mars 2026 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/n3yw